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Abstract. Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general
mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In par-
ticular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that typically
arise from applying decision rules to imprecise-probabilistic uncertainty
models. We provide them with a clear interpretation in terms of attitudes
towards gambling, borrowing ideas from the theory of sets of desirable
gambles, and we use this interpretation to derive a set of basic axioms.
We show that these axioms lead to a full-fledged theory of coherent choice
functions, which includes a representation in terms of sets of desirable
gambles, and a conservative inference method.
1 Introduction
When uncertainty is described by probabilities, decision making is usually done
by maximising expected utility. Except in degenerate cases, this leads to a unique
optimal decision. If, however, the probability measure is only partially specified—
for example by lower and upper bounds on the probabilities of specific events—
this method no longer works. Essentially, the problem is that two different prob-
ability measures that are both compatible with the given bounds may lead to
different optimal decisions. In this context, several generalisations of maximising
expected utility have been proposed; see [6] for an nice overview.
A common feature of many such generalisations is that they yield set-valued
choices : when presented with a set of options, they generally return a subset of
them. If this turns out to be a singleton, then we have a unique optimal deci-
sion, as before. If, however, it contains multiple options, this means that they
are incomparable and that our uncertainty model does not allow us to choose
between them. Obtaining a single decision then requires a more informative un-
certainty model, or perhaps a secondary decision criterion, as the information
present in the uncertainty model does not allow us to single out an optimal op-
tion. Set-valued choice is also a typical feature of decision criteria based on other
uncertainty models that generalise the probabilistic ones to allow for imprecision
and indecision, such as lower previsions and sets of desirable gambles.
Choice functions provide an elegant unifying mathematical framework for
studying such set-valued choice. They map option sets to option sets: for any
given set of options, they return the corresponding set-valued choice. Hence,
when working with choice functions, it is immaterial whether there is some un-
derlying decision criterion. The primitive objects of this framework are simply
the set-valued choices themselves, and the choice function that represents all
these choices, serves as an uncertainty model in and by itself.
A major advantage of working with choice functions is that they allow us to
impose axioms on choices, aimed at characterising what it means for choices to be
rational and internally consistent; see for example the seminal work by Seidenfeld
et al. [5]. Here, we undertake a similar mission, yet approach it from a different
angle. Rather than think of choice in an intuitive manner, we provide it with a
concrete interpretation in terms of attitudes towards gambling, borrowing ideas
from the theory of sets of desirable gambles [1–3, 8]. From this interpretation
alone, and nothing more, we develop a theory of coherent choice that includes a
full set of axioms, a representation in terms of sets of desirable gambles, and a
natural extension theorem.
In order to facilitate the reading, proofs and intermediate results have been
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Choice Functions
A choice function C is a set-valued operator on sets of options. In particular,
for any set of options A, the corresponding value of C is a subset C(A) of A.
The options themselves are typically actions amongst which a subject wishes
to choose. As is customary in decision theory, every action has a corresponding
reward that depends on the state of a variable X , about which the subject is
typically uncertain. Hence, the reward is uncertain too. The purpose of a choice
function is to represent our subject’s choices between such uncertain rewards.
Let us make this more concrete. First of all, the variable X takes values x
in some set of states X . The reward that corresponds to a given option is then
a function u on X . We will assume that this reward can be expressed in terms
of a real-valued linear utility scale, allowing us to identify every option with a
real-valued function on X .1 We take these functions to be bounded and call them
gambles. We use L to denote the set of all such gambles and also let
L>0 := {u ∈ L : u ≥ 0 and u 6= 0} and L≤0 := {u ∈ L : u ≤ 0}.
Option sets can now be identified with subsets of L, which we call gamble
sets. We restrict our attention here to finite gamble sets and will use Q to denote
the set of all such finite subsets of L, including the empty set.
Definition 1 (Choice function). A choice function C is a map from Q to Q
such that C(A) ⊆ A for every A ∈ Q.
Gambles in A that do not belong to C(A) are said to be rejected. This leads
to an alternative representation in terms of so-called rejection functions.
1 A more general approach, which takes options to be elements of an arbitrary vector
space, encompasses the horse lottery approach, and was explored by Van Camp [7].
Our results here can be easily extended to this more general framework.
Definition 2 (Rejection function). The rejection function RC corresponding
to a choice function C is a map from Q to Q, defined by RC(A) := A \ C(A)
for all A ∈ Q.
Since a choice function is completely determined by its rejection function, any
interpretation for rejection functions automatically implies an interpretation for
choice functions. This allows us to focus on the former.
Our interpretation for rejection functions now goes as follows. Consider a
subject whose uncertainty about X is represented by a rejection function RC ,
or equivalently, by a choice function C. Then for a given gamble set A ∈ Q, the
statement that a gamble u ∈ A is rejected from A—that is, that u ∈ RC(A)—is
taken to mean that there is at least one gamble v in A that our subject strictly
prefers over u.
This interpretation is of course still meaningless, because we have not yet
explained the meaning of strict preference. Fortunately, that problem has already
been solved elsewhere: strict preference between elements of L has an elegant
interpretation in terms of desirability [4,8], and it is this interpretation that we
intend to borrow here. To allow us to do so, we first provide a brief introduction
to the theory of sets of desirable gambles.
3 Sets of Desirable Gambles
A gamble u ∈ L is said to be desirable if our subject strictly prefers it over the
zero gamble, meaning that rather than not gamble at all, she strictly prefers to
commit to the gamble where, after the true value x of the uncertain variable X
has been determined, she will receive the (possibly negative) reward u(x).
A set of desirable gambles D is then a subset of L, whose interpretation will
be that it consists of gambles u ∈ L that our subject considers desirable. The
set of all sets of desirable gambles is denoted by D. In order for a set of desirable
gambles to represent a rational subject’s beliefs, it should satisfy a number of
rationality, or coherence, criteria.
Definition 3. A set of desirable gambles D ∈ D is called coherent if it satisfies
the following axioms [1–4]:
D1. 0 /∈ D;
D2. L>0 ⊆ D;
D3. if u, v ∈ D, λ, µ ≥ 0 and λ+ µ > 0, then λu + µv ∈ D.
We denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable gambles by D.
Axioms D1 and D2 follow immediately from the meaning of desirability: zero
cannot be strictly preferred to itself, and any gamble that is never negative but
sometimes positive should be strictly preferred to the zero gamble. Axiom D3 is
implied by the assumed linearity of our utility scale.
Every coherent set of desirable gambles D ∈ D induces a binary preference
order >D—a strict vector ordering—on L, defined by u >D v ⇔ u − v ∈ D,
for all u, v ∈ L. The intuition behind this definition is that a subject strictly
prefers the uncertain reward u over v if she strictly prefers trading v for u over
not trading at all, or equivalently, if she strictly prefers the net uncertain reward
u − v over the zero gamble. The preference order >D fully characterises D: one
can easily see that u ∈ D if and only if u >D 0. Hence, sets of desirable gambles
are completely determined by binary strict preferences between gambles.
4 Sets of Desirable Gamble Sets
Let us now go back to our interpretation for choice functions, which is that a
gamble u in A is rejected from A if and only if there is some gamble v in A that
our subject strictly prefers over u. We will from now on interpret this preference
in terms of desirability: we take it to mean that v − u is desirable. In this way,
we arrive at the following interpretation for a choice function C. Consider any
A ∈ Q and u ∈ A, then
u /∈ C(A)⇔ u ∈ RC(A)⇔ (∃v ∈ A) v − u is desirable. (1)
In other words, if we let A − {u} := {v − u : v ∈ A}, then according to our
interpretation, the statement that u is rejected from A is taken to mean that
A − {u} contains at least one desirable gamble.
A crucial observation here is that this interpretation does not require our
subject to specify a set of desirable gambles. Instead, all that is needed is for
her to specify those gamble sets A ∈ Q that to her contain at least one desirable
gamble. We call such gamble sets desirable gamble sets and collect them in a set
of desirable gamble sets K ⊆ Q. As can be seen from Equation (1), such a set
of desirable gamble sets K completely determines a choice function C and its
rejection function RC :
u /∈ C(A)⇔ u ∈ RC(A)⇔ A − {u} ∈ K, for all A ∈ Q and u ∈ A.
The study of choice functions can therefore be reduced to the study of sets of
desirable gamble sets. We will from now on work directly with the latter. We will
use the collective term choice models for choice functions, rejection functions,
and sets of desirable gamble sets.
Let K denote the set of all sets of desirable gamble sets K ⊆ Q, and consider
any such K. The first question to address is when to call K coherent : which
properties should we impose on a set of desirable gamble sets in order for it
to reflect a rational subject’s beliefs? We propose the following axiomatisation,
using (λ, µ) > 0 as a shorthand notation for ‘λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 and λ+ µ > 0’.
Definition 4 (Coherence). A set of desirable gamble sets K ⊆ Q is called
coherent if it satisfies the following axioms:
K0. ∅ /∈ K;
K1. A ∈ K ⇒ A \ {0} ∈ K, for all A ∈ Q;
K2. {u} ∈ K, for all u ∈ L>0;
K3. if A1, A2 ∈ K and if, for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2, (λu,v , µu,v) > 0, then
{λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A1, v ∈ A2} ∈ K;
K4. A1 ∈ K and A1 ⊆ A2 ⇒ A2 ∈ K, for all A1, A2 ∈ Q.
We denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable gamble sets by K.
Since a desirable gamble set is by definition a set of gambles that contains
at least one desirable gamble, Axioms K0 and K4 are immediate. The other
three axioms follow from the principles of desirability that also lie at the basis
of Axioms D1–D3: the zero gamble is not desirable, the elements of L>0 are
all desirable, and any finite positive linear combination of desirable gambles is
again desirable. Axioms K1 and K2 follow naturally from the first two of these
principles. The argument for Axiom K3 is more subtle; it goes as follows. Since
A1 and A2 are two desirable gamble sets, there must be at least one desirable
gamble u ∈ A1 and one desirable gamble v ∈ A2. Since for these two gambles,
the positive linear combination λu,vu + µu,vv is again desirable, we know that
at least one of the elements of {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A1, v ∈ A2} is a desirable
gamble. Hence, it must be a desirable gamble set.
5 The Binary Case
Because we interpret them in terms of desirability, one might be inclined to
think that sets of desirable gamble sets are simply an alternative representation
for sets of desirable gambles. However, this is not the case: we will see that sets
of desirable gamble sets constitute a much more general uncertainty framework
than sets of desirable gambles. What lies behind this added generality is that it
need not be known which gambles are actually desirable. For example, within the
framework of sets of desirable gamble sets, it is possible to express the belief that
at least one of the gambles u or v is desirable while remaining undecided about
which of them actually is; in order to express this belief, it suffices to state that
{u, v} ∈ K. This is impossible within the framework of sets of desirable gambles.
Any set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K determines a unique set of desirable
gambles based on its binary choices only, given by
DK := {u ∈ L : {u} ∈ K}.
That choice models typically represent more than just binary choice is reflected
in the fact that different K can have the same DK . Nevertheless, there are sets
of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K that are completely characterised by a set of
desirable gambles, in the sense that there is a (necessarily unique) set of desirable
gambles D ∈ D such that K = KD , with
KD := {A ∈ Q : A ∩D 6= ∅}. (2)
It follows from the discussion at the end of Section 3 that such sets of desirable
gamble sets are completely determined by binary preferences between gambles.
We therefore call them, and their corresponding choice functions, binary. For any
such binary set of desirable gamble sets K, the unique set of desirable gambles
D ∈ D such that K = KD is given by DK .
Proposition 5. Consider any set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K. Then K is
binary if and only if KDK = K.
The coherence of a binary set of desirable gamble sets is completely deter-
mined by the coherence of its corresponding set of desirable gambles.
Proposition 6. Consider any binary set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K and
let DK ∈ D be its corresponding set of desirable gambles. Then K is coherent if
and only if DK is.
6 Representation in Terms of Sets of Desirable Gambles
That there are sets of desirable gamble sets that are completely determined by
a set of desirable gambles is nice, but such binary choice models are typically
not what we are interested in here, because then we could just as well use sets
of desirable gambles to represent choice. It is the non-binary coherent choice
models that we have in our sights here. But it turns out that our axioms lead
to a representation result that allows us to still use sets of desirable gambles, or
rather, sets of them, to completely characterise any coherent choice model.
Theorem 7 (Representation). Every coherent set of desirable gamble sets
K ∈ K is dominated by at least one binary set of desirable gamble sets: D(K) :=
{D ∈ D : K ⊆ KD} 6= ∅. Moreover, K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D(K)}.
This powerful representation result allows us to incorporate a number of other
axiomatisations [7] as special cases in a straightforward manner, because the
binary models satisfy the required axioms, and these axioms are preserved under
taking arbitrary non-empty intersections.
7 Natural Extension
In many practical situations, a subject will typically not specify a full-fledged
coherent set of desirable gamble sets, but will only provide some partial assess-
ment A ⊆ Q, consisting of a number of gamble sets for which she is comfortable
about assessing that they contain at least one desirable gamble. We now want to
extend this assessment A to a coherent set of desirable gamble sets in a manner
that is as conservative—or uninformative—as possible. This is the essence of
conservative inference.
We say that a set of desirable gamble sets K1 is less informative than (or
rather, at most as informative as) a set of desirable gamble sets K2, when
K1 ⊆ K2: a subject whose beliefs are represented by K2 has more (or rather, at
least as many) desirable gamble sets—sets of gambles that definitely contain a
desirable gamble—than a subject with beliefs represented by K1. The resulting
partially ordered set (K,⊆) is a complete lattice with intersection as infimum
and union as supremum. The following theorem, whose proof is trivial, identifies
an interesting substructure.
Theorem 8. Let {Ki}i∈I be an arbitrary non-empty family of sets of desirable
gamble sets, with intersection K :=
⋂
i∈I Ki. If Ki is coherent for all i ∈ I, then
so is K. This implies that (K,⊆) is a complete meet-semilattice.
This result is important, as it allows us to a extend a partially specified set of
desirable gamble sets to the most conservative coherent one that includes it. This
leads to the conservative inference procedure we will call natural extension.
Definition 9 (Consistency and natural extension). For any assessment
A ⊆ Q, let K(A) := {K ∈ K : A ⊆ K}. We call the assessment A consistent if
K(A) 6= ∅, and we then call Ex(A) :=
⋂
K(A) the natural extension of A.
In other words: an assessment A is consistent if it can be extended to some
coherent rejection function, and then its natural extension Ex(A) is the least
informative such coherent rejection function.
Our final result provides a more ‘constructive’ expression for this natural ex-
tension and a simpler criterion for consistency. In order to state it, we need to in-
troduce the set Ls>0 := {{u} : u ∈ L>0} and two operators on—transformations
of—K. The first is denoted by Rs, and defined by
Rs(K) := {A ∈ Q : (∃B ∈ K)B \ L≤0 ⊆ A} for all K ∈ K,
so Rs(K) contains all gamble setsA inK, all versions of A with some of their non-
positive options removed, and all supersets of such sets. The second is denoted
by Posi, and defined for all K ∈ K by
Posi(K) :=
{{ n∑
k=1
λu1:nk uk : u1:n ∈ ×
n
k=1Ak
}
: n ∈ N, (A1, . . . , An) ∈ K
n,(
∀u1:n ∈ ×
n
k=1Ak
)
λu1:n1:n > 0
}
,
where we used the notations u1:n and λ
u1:n
1:n for n-tuples of options uk and real
numbers λu1:nk , k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, so u1:n ∈ L
n and λu1:n1:n ∈ R
n. We also used
λu1:n1:n > 0 as a shorthand for ‘λ
u1:n
k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
∑n
k=1 λ
u1:n
k > 0’.
Theorem 10 (Natural extension). Consider any assessment A ⊆ Q. Then
A is consistent if and only if ∅ /∈ A and {0} /∈ Posi(Ls>0 ∪ A). Moreover, if A
is consistent, then Ex(A) = Rs(Posi(Ls>0 ∪ A)).
8 Conclusion
Our representation result shows that binary choice is capable of representing
general coherent choice functions, provided we extend its language with a ‘dis-
junction’ of desirability statements—as is implicit in our interpretation—, next
to the ‘conjunction’ and ‘negation’ that are already implicit in the language of
sets of desirable gambles—see [4] for a clear exposition of the latter claim.
In addition, we have found recently that by adding a convexity axiom, and
working with more general vector spaces of options to allow for the incorporation
of horse lotteries, our interpretation and corresponding axiomatisation allows
for a representation in terms of lexicographic sets of desirable gambles [7], and
therefore encompasses the one by Seidenfeld et al. [5] (without archimedeanity).
We will report on these findings in more detail elsewhere.
Future work will address (i) dealing with the consequences of merging our
accept-reject statement framework [4] with the choice function approach to deci-
sion making; (ii) discussing the implications of our axiomatisation and represen-
tation for conditioning, independence, and indifference (exchangeability); and
(iii) expanding our natural extension results to deal with the computational and
algorithmic aspects of conservative inference with coherent choice functions.
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A Proofs and intermediate results
In this appendix, besides the operators that were introduced in the main text,
we also require two additional ones:
Su : K→ K : K 7→ Su(K) := {A ∈ Q : (∃B ∈ K)B ⊆ A}
and
Rn: K→ K : K 7→ Rn(K) := {A ∈ Q : (∃B ∈ K)B \ L≤0 ⊆ A ⊆ B}.
Applying them in sequence has the same effect as applying the operator Rs.
Lemma 11. Consider any set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K. Then
Rs(K) = Rn(Su(K)).
Proof. Consider any A ∈ Rs(K), which means that there is some B ∈ K such
that B \ L≤0 ⊆ A. Then (A ∪B) \ L≤0 ⊆ (B \ L≤0) ∪ A = A ⊆ A ∪B. Hence,
if we let B′′ := A ∪ B, then B′′ \ L≤0 ⊆ A ⊆ B′′. Since B ∈ K and B ⊆ B′′
implies that B′′ ∈ Su(K), this allows us to conclude that A ∈ Rn(Su(K)).
Conversely, consider any A ∈ Rn(Su(K)), which means that there is some
B ∈ Su(K) such that B \ L≤0 ⊆ A ⊆ B. Then since B ∈ Su(K), there is some
B′ ∈ K such that B′ ⊆ B. Hence, we find that B′ \ L≤0 ⊆ B \ L≤0 ⊆ A, which,
since B′ ∈ K, implies that A ∈ Rs(K). ⊓⊔
Proof (Proposition 5). If KDK = K, then K is trivially binary. So let us assume
that K is binary. We will prove that KDK = K. Since K is binary, there is a set
of desirable gambles D′ ⊆ L such that K = KD′ . For any u ∈ L, this implies
that
{u} ∈ K ⇔ {u} ∈ KD′ ⇔ {u} ∩D
′ 6= ∅ ⇔ u ∈ D′.
Hence, we find that DK = {u ∈ L : {u} ∈ K} = {u ∈ L : u ∈ D′} = D′, which
indeed implies that KDK = KD′ = K. ⊓⊔
Lemma 12. Consider any coherent set of desirable gambles D. Then KD is a
coherent set of desirable gamble sets.
Proof. We need to prove that KD is coherent, or equivalently, that it satisfies
Axioms K0–K4.
For Axiom K0, observe that Equation (2) trivially implies that ∅ /∈ KD . For
Axiom K1, observe that A ∩D 6= ∅ implies that (A \ {0}) ∩D 6= ∅ because we
know from the coherence of D [Axiom D1] that 0 /∈ D. For Axiom K2, observe
that {u} ∈ KD is equivalent to u ∈ D for all u ∈ L, and take into account
the coherence of D [Axiom D2]. For Axiom K3, consider any A1, A2 ∈ KD ,
and let A := {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A1, v ∈ A2} for any particular choice of the
(λu,v , µu,v) > 0 for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ v2. Then A1 ∩D 6= ∅ and A2 ∩D 6= ∅, so
we can fix any u1 ∈ A1 ∩D and u2 ∈ A2 ∩D. The coherence of D [Axiom D3]
then implies that λu1,v2u1+µu1,v2v2 ∈ D, and therefore also A∩D 6= ∅, whence
indeed A ∈ KD . And, finally, that KD satisfies Axiom K4 is an immediate
consequence of its definition (2). ⊓⊔
Lemma 13. Consider any coherent set of desirable gamble sets K. Then DK is
a coherent set of desirable gambles, and KDK ⊆ K.
Proof. We first prove that DK is coherent, or equivalently, that it satisfies Ax-
ioms D1–D3. For Axiom D1, observe that 0 ∈ DK implies that {0} ∈ K. Since
K satisfies Axiom K1, this implies that ∅ ∈ K, contradicting Axiom K0. For
Axiom D2, observe that for any u ∈ L, u ∈ DK is equivalent to {u} ∈ K, and
take into account Axiom K2. And, finally, for Axiom D3, observe that u, v ∈ DK
implies that {u}, {v} ∈ K, and that Axiom K3 then implies that {λu+µv} ∈ K,
or equivalently, that λu + µv ∈ DK , for any choice of (λ, µ) > 0.
For the last statement, consider any A ∈ KDK , meaning that A ∩ DK 6= ∅.
Consider any u ∈ A∩DK , then on the one hand u ∈ DK , so {u} ∈ K. But since
on the other hand also u ∈ A, we see that {u} ⊆ A, and therefore Axiom K4
guarantees that A ∈ K. ⊓⊔
Proof (Proposition 6). First, suppose that DK is coherent. Lemma 12 then
impies that KDK is coherent. Hence, since we know from Proposition 5 that
K = KDK , we find that K is coherent.
Next, suppose thatK is coherent. Lemma 13 then implies thatDK is coherent
as well. ⊓⊔
We will call a coherent set of desirable gamble sets Kˆ maximal, if it is not
dominated by any other coherent set of desirable gamble sets, and we collect
all maximal coherent sets of desirable gamble sets in the set Kˆ ⊆ K: for any
Kˆ ∈ K,
Kˆ ∈ Kˆ⇔ (∀K ∈ K)(Kˆ ⊆ K ⇒ Kˆ = K).
Theorem 14. Any coherent set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K is dominated
by some maximal coherent set of desirable gamble sets: {Kˆ ∈ Kˆ : K ⊆ Kˆ} 6= ∅.
Proof. It is clearly enough to establish that the partially ordered set ↑K :=
{K ′ ∈ K : K ⊆ K ′} has a maximal element, and we use Zorn’s Lemma to that
effect. So consider any chain K in ↑K, then we must prove that K has an upper
bound in ↑K. Since Ko :=
⋃
K is clearly an upper bound, we are done if we can
prove that Ko is coherent.
For Axiom K0, simply observe that since ∅ belongs to no element of K [since
they are all coherent], it cannot belong to their union Ko.
For Axiom K1, consider any A ∈ Ko. Then there is some K
′ ∈ K such that
A ∈ K ′, and since K ′ is coherent, this implies that A \ {0} ∈ K ′ ⊆ Ko.
For Axiom K2, consider any u > 0, then we know that {u} ∈ K [since K is
coherent], and therefore also {u} ∈ Ko, since K ⊆ Ko.
For Axiom K3, consider any A1, A2 ∈ Ko and, for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2,
choose (λu,v , µu,v) > 0. Since A1, A2 ∈ Ko, we know that there are K1,K2 ∈ K
such that A1 ∈ K1 and A2 ∈ K2. Since K is a chain, we can assume without loss
of generality that K1 ⊆ K2, and therefore {A1, A2} ⊆ K2. Since K2 is coherent,
it follows that {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A1, v ∈ A2} ∈ K2 ⊆ Ko.
And finally, for Axiom K4, consider any A1 ∈ Ko and any A2 ∈ Q such that
A1 ⊆ A2. Then we know that there is some K ′ ∈ K such that A1 ∈ K ′. Since
K ′ is coherent, this implies that also A2 ∈ K
′ ⊆ Ko. ⊓⊔
Lemma 15. A coherent set of desirable gamble sets K is binary if and only if
(∀A ∈ K : |A| ≥ 2)(∃u ∈ A)A \ {u} ∈ K. (3)
Proof. First assume that K is binary. We then know from Proposition 5 that
K = KDK , implying that A ∈ K ⇔ A ∩ DK 6= ∅, for all A ∈ Q. Consider
any A ∈ K such that |A| ≥ 2. Then there is some v ∈ A ∩ DK such that
A = {v} ∪ (A \ {v}). But then |A \ {v}| ≥ 1, so we can consider an element
u ∈ A \ {v}. Since clearly v ∈ (A \ {u}) ∩DK , we see that (A \ {u}) ∩DK 6= ∅
and therefore, that A \ {u} ∈ K.
Next assume that Equation (3) holds. Because of Proposition 5, it suffices
to show that KDK = K. We infer from Lemma 13 that DK is a coherent set
of desirable gambles, and that KDK ⊆ K. Assume ex absurdo that KDK ⊂
K, so there is some A ∈ K such that A /∈ KDK , or equivalently, such that
A ∩DK = ∅. But then we must have that |A| ≥ 2, because otherwise A = {v}
with v /∈ DK and therefore A = {v} /∈ K, a contradiction. But then it follows
from Equation (3) that there is some u1 ∈ A such that A1 := A\{u1} ∈ K. Since
it follows from A ∩DK = ∅ that also A1 ∩DK = ∅, we see that also A1 /∈ KDK .
We can now repeat the same argument with A1 instead of A to find that it must
be that |A1| ≥ 2, so there is some u2 ∈ A1 such that A2 := A1 \ {u2} ∈ K and
A2 /∈ KDK . Repeating the same argument over and over again will eventually
lead to a contradiction with |An| ≥ 2. Hence it must be that KDK = K. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16. Consider any set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K that satisfies
Axioms K2 and K3. Consider any A ∈ K. Then for any v ∈ A and any v′ ∈ L
such that v ≤ v′, the gamble set B := {v′}∪ (A \ {v}) obtained by replacing v in
A with the dominating option v′ still belongs to K: B ∈ K.
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that A 6= ∅ and that v′ 6= v.
Let v′′ := v′−v, then v′′ ∈ L>0, and therefore Axiom K2 implies that {v′′} ∈ K.
Applying Axiom K3 for A and {v′′} allows us to infer that {λuu + µuv′′ : u ∈
A} ∈ K for all possible choices of (λu , µu) > 0. Choosing (λu , µu) := (1, 0) for all
u ∈ A \{v} and (λv , µv) := (1, 1) yields in particular that B = {v′}∪ (A \{v}) ∈
K. ⊓⊔
Lemma 17. Consider any set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K that satisfies
Axioms K2 and K3. Consider any A ∈ K such that A ∩ L≤0 6= ∅ and any
v ∈ A ∩ L≤0, and construct the gamble set B := {0} ∪ (A \ {v}) by replacing v
with 0. Then still B ∈ K.
Proof. Immediate consequence of Lemma 16. ⊓⊔
Proposition 18. Consider any coherent set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K,
then Rn(K) = K.
Proof. That K ⊆ Rn(K) is an immediate consequence of the definition of the
Rn operator. To prove that Rn(K) ⊆ K, consider any A ∈ Rn(K), which means
that there is some B ∈ K such that B \ L≤0 ⊆ A ⊆ B. We need to prove that
A ∈ K. Since K satisfies Axiom K4, it suffices to prove that B \ L≤0 ∈ K.
If B∩L≤0 = ∅, then B \L≤0 = B ∈ K. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we may assume that B ∩L≤0 6= ∅. For any u ∈ B ∩L≤0, Lemma 17 implies that
we may replace u by 0 and still be guaranteed that the resulting set belongs to
K. Hence, we can replace all elements of B ∩L≤0 with 0 and still be guaranteed
that the result B′ := {0} ∪ (B \ L≤0) belongs to K. Applying Axiom K1 now
guarantees that, indeed, B \ L≤0 = B′ \ {0} ∈ K. ⊓⊔
Proposition 19. Consider any set of desirable gamble setsK ∈ K. Then Rn(K)
satisfies Axiom K1. Moreover, if K satisfies Axioms K0, K2, K3 and K4 and
does not contain {0}, then so does Rn(K).
Proof. The proof of the first statement is trivial. For the second statement,
assume that K does not contain {0}, and satisfies Axioms K0, K2, K3 and K4.
To prove that Rn(K) satisfies Axiom K0 and does not contain {0}, assume
ex absurdo that ∅ ∈ Rn(K) or {0} ∈ Rn(K). We then find that there is some
B ∈ K such that either B \L≤0 ⊆ ∅ ⊆ B or B \L≤0 ⊆ {0} ⊆ B. In both cases, it
follows that B ⊆ L≤0. If B = ∅, this contradicts our assumption that K satisfies
Axiom K0. If B 6= ∅, it follows from Lemma 17 that we can replace every u ∈ B
by 0 and still be guaranteed that the resulting gamble set {0} belongs to K,
again contradicting our assumptions.
To prove that Rn(K) satisfies Axiom K2, simply observe that the operator
Rn never removes gamble sets from a set of desirable gamble sets, so the gamble
sets {u}, u ∈ L>0, which belong to K by Axiom K2, will also belong to the
larger Rn(K).
To prove that Rn(K) satisfies Axiom K3, consider any A1, A2 ∈ Rn(K),
meaning that there are B1, B2 ∈ K such that B1\L≤0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ B1 and B2\L≤0 ⊆
A2 ⊆ B2. For any u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2, we choose (λu,v , µu,v) > 0, and let
A := {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A1, v ∈ A2}.
Then we have to prove that A ∈ Rn(K). Since K satisfies Axiom K3, we infer
from B1, B2 ∈ K that
C :={λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A1, v ∈ A2}
∪ {1u + 0v : u ∈ B1 \A1, v ∈ B2} ∪ {0u + 1v : u ∈ A1, v ∈ B2 \A2}
=A ∪ {u : u ∈ B1 \A1, v ∈ B2} ∪ {v : u ∈ A1, v ∈ B2 \A2}
belongs to K as well. Furthermore, since B1 \ L≤0 ⊆ A1 and B2 \ L≤0 ⊆ A2
imply that B1 \A1 ⊆ L≤0 and B2 \A2 ⊆ L≤0, we see that
{u : u ∈ B1 \A1, v ∈ B2} ∪ {v : u ∈ A1, v ∈ B2 \A2} ⊆ L≤0.
Hence, C \ L≤0 ⊆ A ⊆ C. Since C ∈ K, this implies that, indeed, A ∈ Rn(K).
Finally, to prove that Rn(K) satisfies Axiom K4, consider any A1 ∈ Rn(K)
and any A2 ∈ Q such that A1 ⊆ A2. We need to prove that A2 ∈ K. That
A1 ∈ Rn(K) implies that there is some B1 ∈ K such that B1 \ L≤0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ B1.
Let B2 := B1 ∪ (A2 \A1), then B1 ⊆ B2 and therefore also B2 ∈ K, because K
satisfies Axiom K4. We now infer from B1 \ L≤0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ B1 that
B2 \ L≤0 ⊆ (B1 \ L≤0) ∪ (A2 \A1) ⊆ A1 ∪ (A2 \A1) ⊆ B1 ∪ (A2 \A1).
Since A1 ∪ (A2 \A1) = A2, this allows us to conclude that B2 \L≤0 ⊆ A2 ⊆ B2,
and therefore, since B2 ∈ K, that, indeed, A2 ∈ Rn(K). ⊓⊔
Proposition 20. Consider a coherent set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K and
any Ao ∈ K such that |Ao| ≥ 2 and Ao \ {u} /∈ K for all u ∈ Ao. Choose any
uo ∈ Ao and let
K∗∗ :=
{{
λvv + µvuo : v ∈ B
}
: B ∈ K, (∀v ∈ B)(λv , µv) > 0
}
. (4)
Then K∗ := Rn(K∗∗) is a coherent set of desirable gamble sets that is a superset
of K and contains {uo}, and furthermore {uo} /∈ K and uo 6≤ 0.
Proof. To prove that {uo} /∈ K, assume ex absurdo that {uo} ∈ K. Since |Ao \
{uo}| ≥ 1, we can pick any element v ∈ Ao \ {uo}, and then {uo} ⊆ Ao \ {v} and
therefore Ao \ {v} ∈ K by Axiom K4, contradicting the assumptions. To prove
that uo 6≤ 0, assume ex absurdo that uo ∈ L≤0, then we infer that also Ao\{uo} ∈
K [use Proposition 18 and the coherence ofK], contradicting the assumptions. To
prove that {uo} ∈ K∗, it suffices to notice that {uo} = {0v+1uo : v ∈ Ao} ∈ K∗∗,
whence also {uo} ∈ K∗. Similarly, since K∗∗ is clearly a superset of K, the same
is true for K∗.
It only remains to prove, therefore, that K∗ is coherent. To this end, we
intend to show that the set of desirable gamble sets K∗∗ satisfies Axioms K0,
K2, K3 and K4 and that {0} /∈ K∗∗. The coherence of K∗ will then be an
immediate consequence of Proposition 19.
For Axiom K0, notice that ∅ /∈ K because K satisfies Axiom K0. It therefore
follows from Equation (4) that, indeed, ∅ /∈ K∗∗.
For Axiom K2, consider any u ∈ L>0. Then {u} ∈ K because K satisfies
Axiom K2. Since K
∗∗ is a superset of K, we see that, indeed, also {u} ∈ K∗∗.
For Axiom K4, consider any A1 ∈ K∗∗ and any A2 ∈ Q such that A1 ⊆ A2,
then we must prove that also A2 ∈ K∗∗. Since A1 ∈ K∗∗, we know that there is
some B1 ∈ K and, for all v ∈ B1, some choice of (λv , µv) > 0, such that
A1 = {λvv + µvuo : v ∈ B1}.
For every u ∈ A2 \A1, we now choose some real αu > 0 such that u−αuuo /∈ B1
and such that, for all u, u′ ∈ A2 \A1, u − αuuo 6= u′ − αu′uo. Since uo 6= 0 and
A1, A2 and B1 are finite, this is clearly always possible. Let
B2 := B1 ∪ {u − αuuo : u ∈ A2 \A1}
and, for each v ∈ B2 \ B1, let uv be the unique element of A2 \ A1 for which
v = uv − αuvuo, and let (λv , µv) := (1, αuv ) > 0. We then see that
A2 = A1 ∪ (A2 \A1)
= {λvv + µvuo : v ∈ B1} ∪ {u − αuuo + αuuo : u ∈ A2 \A1}
= {λvv + µvuo : v ∈ B1} ∪ {v + αuvuo : v ∈ B2 \B1}
= {λvv + µvuo : v ∈ B2}.
Furthermore, since B1 ∈ K and B1 ⊆ B2, it follows from the coherence of K
and Axiom K4 that B2 ∈ K. Hence, indeed, A2 ∈ K∗∗.
For Axiom K3, consider any A1, A2 ∈ K∗∗ and, for all u1 ∈ A1 and u2 ∈ A2,
any choice of (αu1,u2 , βu1,u2) > 0. Then we must prove that
C := {αu1,u2u1 + βu1,u2u2 : u1 ∈ A1, u2 ∈ A2} ∈ K
∗∗.
Since A1, A2 ∈ K
∗∗, there are B1, B2 ∈ K and, for all v1 ∈ B1 and v2 ∈ B2,
some choices of (λ1,v1 , µ1,v1) > 0 and (λ2,v2 , µ2,v2) > 0, such that
A1 = {λ1,v1v1 + µ1,v1uo : v1 ∈ B1} and A2 = {λ2,v2v2 + µ2,v2uo : v2 ∈ B2}.
Now fix any v1 ∈ B1 and v2 ∈ B2, and let (α′v1,v2 , β
′
v1,v2
) := (αu1,u2 , βu1,u2) > 0,
with u1 := λ1,v1v1 + µ1,v1uo and u2 := λ2,v2v2 + µ2,v2uo. Then
C = {α′v1,v2(λ1,v1v1 + µ1,v1uo) + β
′
v1,v2
(λ2,v2v2 + µ2,v2uo) : v1 ∈ B1, v2 ∈ B2}
We consider two cases. If α′v1,v2λ1,v1 + β
′
v1,v2
λ2,v2 > 0, we let
(κv1,v2 , ρv1,v2) := (α
′
v1,v2
λ1,v1 , β
′
v1,v2
λ2,v2) > 0,
(γv1,v2 , δv1,v2) := (1, α
′
v1,v2
µ1,v1 + β
′
v1,v2
µ2,v2) > 0.
If α′v1,v2λ1,v1 + β
′
v1,v2
λ2,v2 = 0, we let
(κv1,v2 , ρv1,v2) := (1, 1) > 0,
(γv1,v2 , δv1,v2) := (0, α
′
v1,v2
µ1,v1 + β
′
v1,v2
µ2,v2) > 0.
In both cases, we find that
γv1,v2(κv1,v2v1 + ρv1,v2v2) + δv1,v2uo
= α′v1,v2(λ1,v1v1 + µ1,v1uo) + β
′
v1,v2
(λ2,v2v2 + µ2,v2uo) ∈ C. (5)
Now let
B :=
{
κv1,v2v1 + ρv1,v2v2 : v1 ∈ B1, v2 ∈ B2
}
.
Then clearly, for all w ∈ B, there are v1 ∈ B1 and v2 ∈ B2 such that w =
κv1,v2v1 + ρv1,v2v2. However, there could be multiple such pairs. We choose any
one such pair and denote its two elements by v1,w and v2,w , respectively. Using
this notation, we now define the set
C′ :=
{
γv1,w ,v2,ww + δv1,w ,v2,wuo : w ∈ B
}
.
Since B1, B2 ∈ K, the coherence of K [Axiom K3] implies that B ∈ K, which in
turn implies that C′ ∈ K∗∗. Also, since
C′ =
{
γv1,w ,v2,ww + δv1,w ,v2,wuo : w ∈ B
}
=
{
γv1,w ,v2,w
(
κv1,w ,v2,w v1,w + ρv1,w ,v2,w v2,w
)
+ δv1,w ,v2,wuo : w ∈ B
}
,
we infer from Equation (5) that C′ ⊆ C. Since we have already proved that K∗∗
satisfies Axiom K4, this implies that, indeed, C ∈ K∗∗.
It therefore now only remains to prove that {0} /∈ K∗∗. So assume ex absurdo
that {0} ∈ K∗∗, meaning that there is some B ∈ K and, for all v ∈ B, some
choice of (λv , µv) > 0, such that {λvv + µvuo : v ∈ B} = {0}. Hence, B 6= ∅ and
λvv + µvuo = 0 for all v ∈ B.
Recall that we already know that uo 6= 0. For any v ∈ B, λvv + µvuo = 0
implies that λv > 0, because otherwise, since (λv , µv) > 0, λv = 0 would imply
that µv > 0 and therefore uo = 0, a contradiction. Hence, for all v ∈ B, v =
−δvuo with δv :=
µv
λv
≥ 0. Now let (κu,v , ρu,v) := (1, 0) for all u ∈ Ao \ {uo} and
v ∈ B, and let (κuo,v , ρuo,v) := (δv , 1) for all v ∈ B. Then
{κu,vu + ρu,vv : u ∈ Ao, v ∈ B}
= {u : u ∈ Ao \ {uo}, v ∈ B} ∪ {δvuo + v : v ∈ B}
= {u : u ∈ Ao \ {uo}, v ∈ B} ∪ {0: v ∈ B}
= {0} ∪ (Ao \ {uo}),
where the last equality follows from B 6= ∅. However, since Ao ∈ K and B ∈ K,
the coherence of K [Axiom K3] implies that {κu,vu + ρu,vv : u ∈ Ao, v ∈ B} ∈
K. We therefore find that {0} ∪ (Ao \ {uo}) ∈ K. The coherence of K now
guarantees that Ao \ {uo} ∈ K [use Axiom K1 if {0} /∈ Ao \ {uo}], contradicting
the assumptions. ⊓⊔
Proposition 21. Any coherent non-binary set of desirable gamble sets K is
strictly dominated, meaning that there is some coherent set of desirable gamble
sets K∗ such that K ⊂ K∗.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary coherent non-binary set of desirable gamble sets
K. We infer from Lemma 15 that there is some Ao ∈ K such that |Ao| ≥ 2 and
Ao \ {u} /∈ K for all u ∈ Ao. Consider any uo ∈ Ao and let K
∗ := Rn(K∗∗),
with K∗∗ as in Equation (4). It then follows from Proposition 20 that K∗ is a
coherent set of desirable gamble sets that is a superset of K and contains {uo},
and that {uo} /∈ K. Hence, K ⊂ K∗. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 7). Let Ko be a coherent set of desirable gamble sets. We prove
that D(Ko) := {D ∈ D : Ko ⊆ KD} 6= ∅ and that Ko =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D(Ko)}.
For the first statement, recall from Theorem 14 that there is some maximal
coherent set of desirable gamble sets Kˆ ∈ Kˆ that dominates Ko: Ko ⊆ Kˆ.
Assume ex absurdo that Kˆ is non-binary. It then follows from Proposition 21
that Kˆ is strictly dominated, contradicting its maximality. Hence, it must be
that Kˆ is binary. Proposition 5 therefore implies that Kˆ = KD , with D = DKˆ .
Furthermore, because Kˆ is coherent, Proposition 6 implies that D is coherent,
whence D ∈ D. Since Ko ⊆ Kˆ = KD , D(Ko) := {D ∈ D : Ko ⊆ KD} 6= ∅.
For the second statement, it is obvious that Ko ⊆
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D(Ko)}, so
we concentrate on the proof of the converse inclusion. Assume ex absurdo that
Ko ⊂
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D(Ko)}, so there is some gamble set Bo ∈ Q such that
Bo /∈ Ko and Bo ∈ KD for all D ∈ D(Ko), so Bo 6= ∅. Then Bo \ L≤0 /∈ Ko [use
the coherence of Ko and Axiom K4] and Bo \ L≤0 ∈ KD for all D ∈ D(Ko) [use
the coherence of KD (which follows from Lemma 12 and the coherence of D)
and Proposition 18], so we may assume without loss of generality that Bo has
no non-positive gambles: Bo ∩ L≤0 = ∅.
The partially ordered set ↑K∗o := {K ∈ K : Ko ⊆ K and Bo /∈ K} is non-
empty because it contains Ko. An argument involving Zorn’s Lemma, analogous
to the one in the proof of Theorem 14, allows us to prove that this partially
ordered set has maximal elements. If we can prove that any such maximal ele-
ment Kˆ is binary, then we know from Propositions 5 and 6 that there is some
coherent set of desirable gambles Do = DKˆ such that Ko ⊆ KDo—and there-
fore Do ∈ D(Ko)—and Bo /∈ KDo , a contradiction. To prove that the maximal
elements of ↑K∗o are binary, it suffices to prove that any non-binary element of
↑K∗o is strictly dominated in that set, which is what we now set out to do.
So consider any non-binary element K of ↑K∗o , so in particular K ∈ K,
Ko ⊆ K and Bo /∈ K. Since K is non-binary, it follows from Lemma 15 that
there is some Ao ∈ K such that |Ao| ≥ 2 and Ao \ {u} /∈ K for all u ∈ Ao. The
partially ordered set {A ∈ K : Bo ⊆ A} contains Ao ∪Bo [because Ao ∈ K and
becauseK satisfies Axiom K4] and therefore has some minimal (non-dominating)
element B∗ below it, so B∗ ∈ K and Bo ⊆ B∗ ⊆ Ao ∪Bo.
Let us first summarise what we know about this minimal element B∗. It is
impossible that B∗ ⊆ Bo because otherwise Bo = B∗ ∈ K, a contradiction.
Hence B∗ \ Bo 6= ∅, so we can fix some element uo in B
∗ \ Bo ⊆ Ao. Since
Bo ⊆ B∗ \ {uo} but B∗ \ {uo} ⊂ B∗, it must be that B∗ \ {uo} /∈ K, by the
definition of a minimal element. Observe that B∗ 6= ∅.
Let K∗ := Rn(K∗∗), with K∗∗ as in Equation (4). Since uo ∈ Ao, it then
follows from Proposition 20 that K∗ is a coherent set of desirable gamble sets
that is a superset of K—and therefore also of Ko—and contains {uo}, and that
{uo} /∈ K and uo 6≤ 0. Hence, it follows that K ⊂ K∗. If we can now prove
that Bo /∈ K∗ and therefore K∗ ∈ ↑K∗o , we are done, because then K is indeed
strictly dominated by K∗ in ↑K∗o .
Assume therefore ex absurdo that Bo ∈ K∗ = Rn(K∗∗). Taking into account
Equation (4), this implies that there are C ∈ K and (λv , µv) > 0 for all v ∈ C,
such that {bv : v ∈ C} \ L≤0 ⊆ Bo ⊆ {bv : v ∈ C}, where, for all v ∈ C,
bv := λvv + µvuo. Given our assumption that Bo ∩ L≤0 = ∅, this also implies
that {bv : v ∈ C} \ Bo ⊆ L≤0. Now let C1 := {v ∈ C : bv ∈ Bo} and C2 := {v ∈
C : bv /∈ Bo}. Then C1 6= ∅ [because Bo 6= ∅] and {bv : v ∈ C1} = Bo. Consider
now any v ∈ C2. Then bv /∈ Bo. Since {bv : v ∈ C} \ Bo ⊆ L≤0, this implies
that bv = λvv + µvuo ≤ 0. Hence, we must have that λv > 0, because otherwise
µvuo ≤ 0 with µv > 0, and therefore also uo ≤ 0, contradicting what we inferred
earlier from Proposition 20. So we find that
v ≤ −
µv
λv
uo for all v ∈ C2.
Consequently, and because C1 ∪C2 = C ∈ K, we infer from Lemma 16 that
C′ := C1 ∪
{
−
µv
λv
uo : v ∈ C2
}
∈ K.
Let C3 := C
′\C1. Then for all v ∈ C3, there is some γv ≥ 0 such that v = −γvuo.
Now let (αuo,v , βuo,v) := (µv , λv) for all v ∈ C1 and (αuo,v , βuo,v) := (γv , 1) for
all v ∈ C3 and, for all u ∈ B∗ \ {uo} and v ∈ C′, let (αu,v , βu,v) := (1, 0). Then
{αu,vu + βu,vv : u ∈ B
∗, v ∈ C′}
= {µvuo + λvv : v ∈ C1} ∪ {γvuo + v : v ∈ C3} ∪ {u : u ∈ B
∗ \ {uo}, v ∈ C
′}
= {bv : v ∈ C1} ∪ {0: v ∈ C3} ∪ {u : u ∈ B
∗ \ {uo}}
= Bo ∪ {0: v ∈ C3} ∪ (B
∗ \ {uo})
= (B∗ \ {uo}) ∪ {0: v ∈ C3},
where the second equality holds because C′ ∈ K and Axiom K0 imply that
∅ 6= C′, and where the fourth equality holds because Bo ⊆ B∗ \ {uo}. Since
B∗ ∈ K and C′ ∈ K, we can now invoke Axiom K3 to find that
B∗ \ {uo} ∪ {0: v ∈ C3} = {αu,vu + βu,vv : u ∈ B
∗, v ∈ C′} ∈ K.
If C3 = ∅, we find that B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K, a contradiction. If C3 6= ∅, we find that
{0} ∪ B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K. If 0 ∈ B∗ \ {uo}, then we get that B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K, a
contradiction. And if 0 /∈ B∗ \{uo}, then we can still derive from Axiom K1 that
B∗ \ {uo} ∈ K, again a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Proposition 22. For any set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K, Posi(K) satisfies
Axiom K3.
Proof. To prove that Posi(K) satisfies Axiom K3, consider any A,B ∈ Posi(K)
and, for all u ∈ A and v ∈ B, any (λu,v , µu,v) > 0. Then we need to prove that
C := {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A, v ∈ B} ∈ Posi(K)
Since A,B ∈ Posi(K), we know that there are m,n ∈ N, (A1, . . . , Am) ∈ Km
and (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ K
n and, for all u1:m ∈ ×
m
k=1Ak and v1:n ∈ ×
n
ℓ=1Bℓ, some
choice of λu1:m1:m > 0 and µ
v1:n
1:n > 0 such that
A =
{ m∑
k=1
λu1:mk uk : u1:m ∈ ×
m
k=1Ak
}
and B =
{ n∑
ℓ=1
µv1:nℓ vℓ : v1:n ∈ ×
n
ℓ=1Bℓ
}
.
(6)
For all u1:m ∈ ×mk=1Ak and v1:n ∈ ×
n
ℓ=1Bℓ, we introduce the simplifying notation
au1:m :=
m∑
k=1
λu1:mk uk and bv1:n :=
n∑
ℓ=1
µv1:nℓ vℓ,
so A = {au1:m : u1:m ∈ ×
m
k=1Ak} and B = {bv1:n : v1:n ∈ ×
n
ℓ=1Bℓ}, and therefore
C = {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A, v ∈ B}
=
{
λau1:m ,bv1:nau1:m + µau1:m ,bv1:n bv1:n : u1:m ∈ ×
m
k=1Ak, v1:n ∈ ×
n
ℓ=1Bℓ
}
.
If we now introduce the notations
Ci :=
{
Ai if 1 ≤ i ≤ m
Bi−m if m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ n
and for any w1:m+n ∈ ×
m+n
i=1 Ci,
κ
w1:m+n
i :=
{
λaw1:m ,bwm+1:m+nλ
w1:m
i if 1 ≤ i ≤ m
µaw1:m ,bwm+1:m+nµ
wm+1:m+n
i−m if m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ n,
where we used wm+1:m+n to denote the tuple (wm+1, . . . , wm+n), then we find
that
C =
{m+n∑
i=1
κ
w1:m+n
i wi : w1:m+n ∈ ×
m+n
i=1 Ci
}
.
Furthermore, since (λaw1:m ,bwm+1:m+n , µaw1:m ,bwm+1:m+n ) > 0, λ
w1:m
1:m > 0 and
µ
wm+1:m+n
1:n > 0, it follows that also
κ
w1:m+n
1:m+1 := (κ
w1:m+n
1 , . . . , κ
w1:m+n
m+1 ) > 0.
Hence, we find that, indeed, C ∈ Posi(K). ⊓⊔
Proposition 23. Consider any set of desirable gamble setsK ∈ K. Then Su(K)
satisfies Axiom K4. Moreover, if K satisfies Axioms K0, K2 and K3 and does
not contain {0}, then so does Su(K).
Proof. For the first statement, consider any A1 ∈ Su(K) and any A2 ∈ Q such
that A1 ⊆ A2. Then there is some B1 ∈ K such that B1 ⊆ A1, and therefore
also B1 ⊆ A2, whence indeed A2 ∈ Su(K).
For the second statement, assume that K satisfies Axioms K0, K2 and K3
and does not contain {0}.
To prove that Su(K) satisfies Axiom K2, simply observe that the operator
Su never removes gamble sets from a set of desirable gamble sets, so the gamble
sets {u}, u ∈ L>0, that belong to K by Axiom K2, will also belong to the larger
Su(K).
To prove that Su(K) satisfies Axiom K3, consider any A1, A2 ∈ Su(K), mean-
ing that there are B1, B2 ∈ K such that B1 ⊆ A1 and B2 ⊆ A2. For all u ∈ A1
and v ∈ A2, choose some (λu,v , µu,v) > 0, and let
A := {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ A1, v ∈ A2}.
We then need to prove that A ∈ Su(K). Since K satisfies Axiom K3, we infer
from B1, B2 ∈ K that
B := {λu,vu + µu,vv : u ∈ B1, v ∈ B2} ∈ K.
Since B ⊆ A, this implies that, indeed, A ∈ Su(K).
Finally, to prove that {0} /∈ Su(K) and that Su(K) satisfies Axiom K0,
assume ex absurdo that {0} ∈ Su(K) or ∅ ∈ Su(K). Then {0} ∈ K or ∅ ∈ K.
In either case, we obtain a contradiction with the assumption that K satisfies
Axiom K0 and does not contain {0}. ⊓⊔
Proposition 24. Consider any coherent set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K,
then Posi(K) = K.
Proof. That K ⊆ Posi(K), is an immediate consequence of the definition of the
Posi operator, and holds for any set of desirable gamble sets, coherent or not.
Indeed, consider any A ∈ K, then it is not difficult to see that A ∈ Posi(K):
choose n := 1, A1 := A ∈ K1, and λ
u1:1
1:1
:= 1 for all u1:1 ∈ ×1k=1A1 = A in the
definition of the Posi operator.
For the converse inclusion, that Posi(K) ⊆ K, we use the coherence of K,
and in particular the representation result of Theorem 7, which allows us to
write that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈ D and K ⊆ KD}.
So, if we fix any D ∈ D such that K ⊆ KD , then it clearly suffices to prove
that also Posi(K) ⊆ KD . Consider, therefore, any A ∈ Posi(K), meaning that
there are n ∈ N, (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Kn and, for all u1:n ∈ ×nk=1Ak, some choice of
λu1:n1:n > 0 such that
A =
{ n∑
k=1
λu1:nk uk : u1:n ∈ ×
n
k=1Ak
}
.
For any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, since Ak ∈ K ⊆ KD , we know that Ak∩D 6= ∅, so we can
fix some vk ∈ Ak ∩ D. Then, on the one hand, we see that
∑n
k=1 λ
v1:n
k vk ∈ A.
On the other hand, since λv1:n1:n > 0, we infer from Axiom D3 [by applying it
multiple times] that also
∑n
k=1 λ
v1:n
k vk ∈ D. Therefore, we find that A ∩D 6= ∅,
or equivalently, that A ∈ KD . Since A ∈ Posi(K) was chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that, indeed, Posi(K) ⊆ KD . ⊓⊔
Theorem 25. An assessment A ⊆ Q is consistent if and only if ∅ /∈ A and
{0} /∈ Posi(Ls>0 ∪A).
Proof. For notational simplicity, we will denote the set of desirable gamble sets
Posi(Ls>0 ∪A) by Ko.
First, assume that ∅ /∈ A and {0} /∈ Ko. Observe that Ko satisfies Ax-
iom K2 by construction and Axiom K3 by Proposition 22. Furthermore, ∅ /∈ A
implies that ∅ /∈ Ko, and therefore, that Ko satisfies Axiom K0. Since {0} /∈ Ko
by assumption, it therefore follows from Proposition 23 that Su(Ko) satisfies
Axioms K0, K2, K3 and K4, and that {0} /∈ Su(Ko), so we gather from Propo-
sition 19 that K1 := Rn(Su(Ko)) satisfies Axioms K0-K4. Since K1 includes A
[none of the operators Posi, Su and Rn remove gamble sets from their arguments,
they only add new gamble sets], this implies that K1 ∈ K(A), and therefore,
that A is consistent.
Next, assume that A is consistent, which means thatK(A) 6= ∅. Consider any
K ∈ K(A), which means that K is coherent and A ⊆ K. Then Ls>0 ∪ A ⊆ K
[use Axiom K2] and therefore also Ko = Posi(Ls>0 ∪ A) ⊆ Posi(K) = K [for
the inclusion, use the definition of the Posi operator, and for the equality, use
Proposition 24]. Now assume ex absurdo that {0} ∈ Ko. Then also {0} ∈ K
and therefore, Axiom K1 implies that ∅ ∈ K, which is impossible because of
Axiom K0. Hence, we find that {0} /∈ Ko. Finally, since K is coherent, Axiom K0
implies that ∅ /∈ K, which, since A ⊆ K, implies that ∅ /∈ A. ⊓⊔
Proposition 26. Consider any coherent set of desirable gamble sets K ∈ K,
then Su(K) = K.
Proof. That K ⊆ Su(K) is an immediate consequence of the definition of the Su
operator. The converse inclusion follows from the fact that K is coherent and
therefore satisfies Axiom K4. ⊓⊔
Theorem 27. For a consistent assessment A ⊆ Q, Ex(A) = Rs(Posi(Ls>0∪A)).
Proof. Assume that A is consistent. Theorem 25 then tells us that ∅ /∈ A and
{0} /∈ Ko := Posi(Ls>0 ∪A). We have to prove that Ex(A) = Rs(Ko), or equiva-
lently, due to Lemma 11, that Ex(A) = K1 := Rn(Su(Ko)).
We already know from the proof of Theorem 25 that ∅ /∈ A and {0} /∈ Ko
implies that K1 ∈ K(A), and therefore also Ex(A) ⊆ K1. To prove the converse
inclusion, consider any K ∈ K(A). Then as shown in the proof of Theorem 25,
Ko ⊆ K. Hence also Su(Ko) ⊆ Su(K) = K [for the inclusion, use the definition
of the Su operator, and for the equality, use Proposition 26], and therefore also
K1 = Rn(Su(Ko)) ⊆ Rn(K) = K [for the inclusion, use the definition of the Rn
operator, and for the equality, use Proposition 18]. So K1 ⊆ K. Since this is true
for every K ∈ K(A), and since the consistency of A implies that K(A) 6= ∅, we
conclude that K1 ⊆ Ex(A). ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 10). Immediately from Theorems 25 and 27. ⊓⊔
